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I. INTRODUCTION
November 17, 2010 started and ended like a normal day for most people.
For working women across the United States, it was another slap in the face.
The defeat of the Paycheck Fairness Act (“PFA” or “Act”)1 in the U.S. Senate
delivered a strong blow to the pay equality movement and women across
the country.2 Among other objectives, the Act sought to provide for punitive
damages for sex-based pay discrimination and to limit the ability of employers
to assert that a factor other than sex prompted a difference in pay.3 Ultimately,
the Act sought to rectify pay discrepancies between the sexes; on average,
women in the United States make seventy-seven cents for every dollar earned
by a man.4
In today’s world, fair and equal pay for equal work should be the norm,
but, sadly, that is not the case for most American women.5 Although the
wage gap between men and women has decreased, there is still work to
be done to bridge that difference.6 The death of the Paycheck Fairness Act
should not, and cannot, be the end of the fight for wage equality.7 This
Note will contextualize the Paycheck Fairness Act’s importance in the
1.
Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 182, 111th Cong. (2009). The Act was reported to
committee in January of 2009 and then had no movement until it was reintroduced in 2010
as S. 3772, 111th Cong. (2010) by Senator Reid. Ultimately, despite being approved by the
House of Representatives, the Senate voted down the bill in November 2010. Pay Equity
Information, NAT’L COMM. ON PAY EQUITY, http://www.pay-equity.org/info-leg.html (last
visited Apr. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Pay Equity Information]..
2.
See Mark Gruenberg, Senate Kills Paycheck Fairness Act, INT’L LABOR COMMC’NS
ASS’N (Nov. 19, 2010), http://ilcaonline.org/content/senate-kills-paycheck-fairness-act
(stating how the Act was defeated along party lines, with the two female Republican
senators from Maine voting against the Act).
3.
See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., HOW THE PAYCHECK FAIRNESS ACT WILL STRENGTHEN
THE EQUAL PAY ACT 1–2 (2010) [hereinafter NWLC, STRENGTHEN EQUAL PAY ACT], available
at
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Broad_Paycheck_Fairness_Fact_Sheet.
pdf (noting that the Paycheck Fairness Act would strengthen the remedies available under
the Equal Pay Act by allowing for liquidated damages and back pay awards, in addition
to limiting the “factor other than sex” affirmative defense only to situations where the
employer can show that the pay differential is related to job performance and consistent
with a business necessity—and not merely caused by the gender of the employee).
4.
Id.
5.
See generally NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., WOMEN’S LOWER WAGES WORSEN THEIR
CIRCUMSTANCES IN A DIFFICULT ECONOMY 1 (2010) [hereinafter NWLC, WOMEN’S LOWER
WAGES], available at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/lowerwageshurtwomen.
pdf (observing that while other civil rights laws have helped narrow the wage gap, issues
still exist in the enforcement of wage equality between sexes).
6.
See Closing the Loophole: The Paycheck Fairness Act and Eliminating Caps on
Damages, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR. (Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.nwlc.org/resource/closingloophole-paycheck-fairness-act-and-eliminating-caps-damages [hereinafter Closing the
Loophole] (stating that “[u]nlike most anti-discrimination statutes, the [Equal Pay Act]
does not currently allow the award of compensatory or punitive damages” and limits lesser
paid women to “unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation” and “an
additional equal amount as liquidated damages” (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)).
7.
See Gruenberg, supra note 2 (announcing that the leading women’s rights
organizations would be meeting to discuss future strategy after the defeat of the PFA).
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pay equality movement and for all working women in the United States.
To that end, Part II of this Note will discuss the background of the pay equality
movement. Part III will analyze why the Paycheck Fairness Act should be
enacted and why a remedy is necessary to rectify the current issues in wage
inequality.
II. BACKGROUND
A. What Wage Inequality Really Looks Like
Wage inequality exists not only between the sexes but also across racial
and national origin lines, state lines, and even among members of white-collar
professions.8 Census data from 2009 shows, on average, American women
earn seventy-seven cents for every dollar their male counterparts receive.9
African-American women make sixty-one cents for each dollar earned by
white, non-Hispanic men, and Latina women make fifty-two cents for each
dollar earned by white, non-Hispanic men.10 The District of Columbia shows
the smallest wage gap between men and women; with women earning 88.2%
of what men earn.11 The largest wage gap is seen in Wyoming, where women
make 65.5% of what men make.12
In October 2010, the National Association of Women Lawyers (“NAWL”)
and the NAWL Foundation released a national report on the retention and
promotion of women in law firms.13 In this report, the NAWL found that
women, while representing approximately 50% of all law school graduates,
still do not earn as much as their male colleagues.14 Women equity partners
8.
See, e.g., Kevin Clark & Patrick Maggitti, How Women Can Reduce Their Wage
Gap, FORBES (Mar. 19, 2010, 12:02 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/03/19/womencompensation-pay-leadership-careers-ceiling.html (discussing a study among white-collar
professionals enrolled in MBA programs that looked at, among other factors, compensation
among men and women).
9.
NWLC, WOMEN’S LOWER WAGES, supra note 5, at 1 & n.2 (utilizing U.S. Census
Bureau income data for persons aged fifteen and older of Hispanic origin).
10.
See id.; NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT OF 2009, at 1
(2009) [hereinafter NWLC, FAIR PAY ACT], available at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/
files/pdfs/Ledbetter%20Fair%20Pay%20Act%20of%202009%20-%20Summary%20
of%20case%20and%20Bill.pdf.
11.
See Wage Gap Persists in All 50 States Fact Sheet, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR.
(Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.nwlc.org/resource/wage-gap-persists-all-50-states (citing U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, MEN’S AND WOMEN’S EARNINGS BY STATE: 2009 AMERICAN COMMUNITY
SURVEY (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/acsbr09-3.pdf).
12.
Id.
13.
See STEPHANIE A. SCHARF & BARBARA M. FLOM, THE NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWYERS
& THE NAWL FOUNDATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTH ANNUAL NATIONAL SURVEY ON RETENTION
AND PROMOTION OF WOMEN IN LAW FIRMS 3–4 (2010), http://nawl.timberlakepublishing.
com/files/NAWL%202010%20Final(1).pdf (finding that women are underrepresented in
law firm leadership, as they only account for 15% of the equity partners, are not listed as
major rainmakers, and earn less than their male counterparts).
14.
See id. at 2, 3–4 (observing that, despite the fact that women make up fifty percent
of the law school graduates, women only account for fifteen percent of equity partnership
in law firms and earn less than their male counterparts).
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make 85% of what their male counterparts make.15 Moreover, although
associate pay is generally “on a par” for both men and women, wage gaps
begin to appear as women move higher up in the law firm hierarchy.16
B. Legislative Background
The Civil Rights era saw the passage of two important pieces of legislation
related to sex-based discrimination: the Equal Pay Act of 196317 and the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,18 signed into law by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson
(respectively).19 The Equal Pay Act was an amendment to the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA);20 among other requirements, the Equal Pay Act
established a minimum wage for employees.21 The primary aim of the Equal
Pay Act was to prohibit the payment of unequal wages between men and
women for equal work.22 At that time, women were earning fifty-nine cents to
every dollar earned by men.23 President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act in
1964 in an effort to continue President Kennedy’s civil rights legislation after
President Kennedy was assassinated in 1963.24 Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act covers employment-based discrimination of protected classes, one of
which is sex.25
The Equal Pay Act mandates the payment of equal wages to men and women
in the same establishment when they perform equal work; provided that their
15.
Id. at 4.
16.
See id. at 21–22 (emphasizing that even though the survey found that the associate
compensation appears to be equal, differentials begin to appear at the counsel, non-equity,
and equity partner levels, with female counsel earning eighty-eight percent, non-equity
partners earning ninety-four percent, and equity partners earning eighty-five percent of
what their male counterparts earn).
17.
Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006)).
18.
Pub. L. No. 88-325, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(2006)).
19.
See Overview of the Equal Pay Act, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN http://www.
aauw.org/act/laf/library/payequity_epa.cfm (last visited Apr. 8, 2011) (stating the Equal
Pay Act extended wage protection to women, while Title VII broadened protections to all
employment actions based on protected classes—including sex).
20.
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201–19 (2006).
21.
See § 206(d) (prohibiting discrimination based on sex in the payment of wages).
22.
See Closing the Loophole, supra note 6 (noting that President Kennedy signed the
Equal Pay Act into law, making the payment of unequal wages illegal because he thought
of the Equal Pay Act as an essential component of the civil rights movement).
23.
Id.; see Albert H. Ross & Frank V. McDermott, Jr., The Equal Pay Act of 1963:
A Decade of Enforcement, 16 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1974) (claiming that the
Equal Pay Act was a result of the call of the War Labor Board for adjustments to equalize
the wage and salary rates of men and women that was later adopted by the Commission on
the Status of Women, created by President Kennedy).
24.
See RICHARD C. CORTNER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS: THE HEART
OF ATLANTA MOTEL AND MCCLUNG CASES 14 (2001) (recalling President Lyndon B. Johnson’s
comments to Congress that “no ‘memorial oration or eulogy could more eloquently honor
President Kennedy’s memory than the earliest possible passage of the civil rights bill for
which he fought so long.’”).
25.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (providing that it is “unlawful . . . to apply
different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment [on the basis] of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”).
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jobs “require[] equal skill, effort, and responsibility;” and they work under
similar working conditions.26 However, the Act allows differences in wages
if an employer bases the wage differential on “(i) a seniority system; (ii) a
merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.”27
Nevertheless, despite the passage of both of these important pieces of
legislation, women still receive less pay than their male counterparts for
doing equal work.28 Loopholes in both laws allow employers to justify paying
different wages to male and female employees doing equal work.29
C. Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Lilly Ledbetter was a female manager at Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Company’s plant in Gadsden, Alabama.30 She worked for the company from
1979 until 1998.31 By the time Ledbetter retired in 1998, she had attained
the position of Area Manager.32 She was one of a few female supervisors at
the Gadsden plant and she faced many instances of sexual harassment while
working there.33 At one point, her male supervisor allegedly told her that
“‘women didn’t belong in the company.’”34 This supervisor consistently rated
her near the bottom of all Area Managers each performance year.35 Another
supervisor offered her a better evaluation in exchange for sexual favors.36
26.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006).
27.
Id.
28.
See Closing the Loophole, supra note 6 (highlighting the fact that although the
wage gap has narrowed there is a substantial need to change the current law to ensure that
the wage gap between sexes ceases to exist).
29.
See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR, PAYCHECK FAIRNESS: CLOSING THE “FACTOR OTHER
THAN SEX” GAP IN THE EQUAL PAY ACT 1 (2009) [hereinafter NWLC, PAYCHECK FAIRNESS],
available at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/FactorOtherThanSex.pdf (noting
evidence of employers using the loopholes provided under § 206(d)(1) to justify otherwise
illegal practices and stating the need to readdress the gaps of the law).
30.
See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007) (observing
that during Ledbetter’s nineteen-year tenure at Goodyear, salaried managers received—or
were denied—“raises based on their supervisors’ evaluation of their performance”).
31.
Id.
32.
See Bindu George, Note, Ledbetter v. Goodyear: A Court Out of Touch With the
Realities of the American Workplace, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 253, 256 (2008)
(stating that although Ledbetter was an Area Manager, in 1997, on the advice of her male
supervisor, Ledbetter applied for and received the non-supervisory position of Technology
Engineer, but she still functioned as an Area Manager).
33.
NWLC, FAIR PAY ACT, supra note 10, at 1.
34.
Paula A. Monopoli, In A Different Voice: Lessons from Ledbetter, 34 J.C. &
U.L. 555, 560 (2008) (indicating that the supervisor that made this comment reflected his
opinion of women not belonging at Goodyear by making sure that she received lower pay
increases than her male counterparts over the years).
35.
See George, supra note 32, at 255 (noting that Ledbetter was ranked twenty-third
out of twenty-four salaried employees).
36.
Charles A. Sullivan, Raising the Dead?: The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 84
TUL. L. REV. 499, 508 (2010) (detailing the sexual harassment that Ledbetter faced from
several male employees at her time at Goodyear, when she complained to management
no action was taken, and when she finally complained to EEOC, after which she faced
retribution from her coworkers).
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During her employment, Ledbetter was unaware that she was being paid
less than her male counterparts.37 While some of her male co-workers bragged
about how much they made working overtime, the company had a policy that
did not allow employees to discuss their pay among themselves.38 Ledbetter
had received raises throughout the years but had no idea that the difference in
pay was significant.39 It was not until Ledbetter received an anonymous note
informing her that she was being paid less than her male colleagues that she
suspected pay discrepancy.40 At the conclusion of 1997, Ledbetter was earning
$3,727 per month, in contrast with the lowest paid male area manager who
made $4,286 a month, and the highest paid male area manager who made
$5,236 a month.41 Consequently, Ledbetter filed a formal charge alleging sexbased discrimination with the EEOC in July 1998.42 In November 1998, she
filed suit in federal district court and alleged violations of Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act.43
The district court allowed Ledbetter’s Title VII claim to proceed to trial
but granted summary judgment in favor of Goodyear for the Equal Pay Act
claim and several other of her claims.44 A jury found for Ledbetter on her
Title VII discrimination claim and awarded her back pay plus damages.45
37.
NWLC, FAIR PAY ACT, supra note 10, at 1.
38.
Sullivan, supra note 36, at 508 (describing how, when Ledbetter first began
working for Goodyear, all of the supervisors were paid the same but as time passed,
Goodyear adopted a subjective performance-based system in which employees were told
that the amount that they were paid was strictly confidential). For more on the illegality
under Title VII of employer pay scale schemes which allow management to base promotion
and wages on characteristics other than on their performance, see, for example, Carpenter
v. Stephen F. Austin State University, 706 F.2d 608, 613, 633 (5th Cir. 1983), which held
that a pay plan that arbitrarily assigned predominantly blacks and women to lower paying
job classifications would be illegal under Title VII and affected employees would be
entitled to back pay.
39.
See Sullivan, supra note 36, at 508 (recounting that some of Ledbetter’s pay
raises were “pretty good, percentage-wise,” which led her to believe that there was not a
substantial disparity between her pay and the pay of male employees doing the same job
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
40.
See id. (observing that after Ledbetter found out she was paid substantially less
than her male counterparts, that discovery provoked her to quickly go to the EEOC and file
a formal claim against Goodyear).
41.
See Monopoli, supra note 34, at 563 (citing Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 550 U.S. 618, 643 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
42.
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621–22 & n.1 (2007)
(majority opinion), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
43.
Id. at 621–22.
44.
Id. at 622.
45.
Id.; see Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 99-C-3137-E, 2003
WL 25507253, at *1–2 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 24, 2003) (stating that Ledbetter was awarded
approximately $3.3 million in compensatory and punitive damages in addition to the back
pay award), rev’d, 421 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded
by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5; see also
Sullivan, supra note 36, at 508–09 (stating that the jury awarded Ledbetter three million
dollars in compensatory and punitive damages, but “the trial judge reduced the damage
award to $300,000” due to the Title VII statutory damages award cap).
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Goodyear appealed to the Eleventh Circuit and contended that Ledbetter’s
pay discrimination claims were time-barred before her EEOC contact.46 The
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and held that a plaintiff
“can state a timely [Title VII pay discrimination claim] for disparate pay only
to the extent that the ‘discrete acts of discrimination’ of which she complains,
occurred within the limitations period created by her EEOC questionnaire.
Any acts of discrimination affecting her salary occurring before then are timebarred.”47
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Ledbetter sought review of the following
question:
Whether and under what circumstances a plaintiff may bring an action under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging illegal pay discrimination
when the disparate pay is received during the statutory limitations period,
but is the result of intentionally discriminatory pay decisions that occurred
outside the limitations period.48

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard oral arguments on November
27, 2006.49 Then, on May 29, 2007—nearly ten years after Ledbetter first
contacted the EEOC—the Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, affirmed
the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that the discriminatory acts claimed by Ledbetter
were untimely and that her claim was time-barred.50
D. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
In 2009, in one of his first acts as President, President Obama signed into
law the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009—which superseded the Court’s
decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear.51 The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act restored the
rights taken away by the Court’s decision in Ledbetter and established that
“pay discrimination claims on the basis of sex, race, national origin, age,
46.
See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2006)
(holding that under National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002),
Ledbetter’s claims of discrimination were time-barred under the statute of limitations
created by her EEOC questionnaire), aff’d, 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute,
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
47.
Id. at 1180.
48.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 548
U.S. 903 (2006) (No. 05–1074).
49.
Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 618.
50.
The majority of the court, in an opinion authored by Justice Alito, upheld the
decision of the Eleventh Circuit and held that because a pay decision is an act that is made
at a particular point in time, an EEOC statutory period begins when the act occurs. Id. at
621. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, authored a dissenting
opinion that claims that the majority is incorrect and that the 180-day statutory period
should be combined for each offense, rather than run for each offense individually, because
pay disparities accumulate over time. Id. at 646–47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
51.
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (amending
42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (2006)); see Carolyn E. Sorock, Note, Closing the Gap Legislatively:
Consequences of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1199, 1209 (2010)
(noting that several Republican Senators feared that, without deadlines for filing, suits over
pay discrimination would be unduly burdensome for businesses).
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religion, and/or disability ‘accrue’” with each discriminatory act.52 Qualifying
discriminatory acts include the receipt of a discriminatory paycheck, the
adoption of or an employee’s subjection to a “discriminatory pay decision or
practice.”53 Whenever such an act occurs, a pay discrimination claim can move
forward under the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.54 Moreover, the Act is effective as
of the day prior to the Supreme Court’s Ledbetter decision.55
Since the enactment of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, several cases have applied
the expanded statutory time limitations period.56 Courts have confirmed
the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act’s greater statutory timeframe by allowing each
discriminatory paycheck to renew the limitations period for pay discrimination
claims.57 As such, each time an employee receives a paycheck based on a
discriminatory pay decision, the time period in which an employee mayt file
an EEOC complaint starts anew.
Despite the passage of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, other issues still exist in
the fight for equal pay. One issue concerns the meaning of the clause: “when
an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or
other practice.”58 Courts have interpreted this phrase in different ways and have
reached different outcomes.59 Additionally, what qualifies as a “compensation

52.
NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT OF 2009: ONE YEAR
LATER 1 (2010) [hereinafter NWLC, ONE YEAR LATER], available at http://www.nwlc.org/
sites/default/files/pdfs/Ledbetter_FPA_One_Year_Later.pdf.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
Id.
56.
See, e.g., Mikula v. Alleghany Cnty. (Mikula I), 583 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009)
(holding that each discriminatory paycheck renewed the time for filing a pay discrimination
claim under the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act), rev’d, 583 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2009); Hester v. N.
Ala. Ctr. for Educ. Excellence, 353 F. App’x 242, 243–44 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding that
the plaintiff’s claim was timely under the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act); Johnson v. District of
Columbia, 632 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22–23 (D.D.C. 2009) (reinstating the plaintiff’s claims after
the passage of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act and stating “there can be no dispute that, under
the Fair Pay Act, plaintiff may seek relief under” the relevant federal laws); Goodlett v.
Delaware, No. 08-298-LPS, 2009 WL 585451, at *6 (D. Del. Mar. 6, 2009) (holding that
the plaintiff’s pay disparity claim survived after the passage of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
and “the 300-day clock for filing a Title VII pay disparity claim starts anew with each
discriminatory pay period”).
57.
See NWLC, ONE YEAR LATER, supra note 52, at 1.
58.
42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(e)(3)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
59.
Compare Mikula I, 320 F. App’x at 136 (holding under Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), that plaintiff’s claims were untimely, due to
the fact that they were not filed within 180 days of the occurrence with the EEOC), with
Mikula v. Allegheny Cnty. (Mikula II), 583 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (recognizing that
the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act effectively overruled the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter
and holding that the plaintiff’s claim was timely). See, e.g., Schengrund v. Pa. State Univ.,
705 F. Supp. 2d 425, 432–33 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (articulating that plaintiffs “may recover
for each and every paycheck received from the present dating back to 300 days prior
to their filing with the EEOC”). But cf. AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. 1962, 1973
(2009) (holding that the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act does not apply in the calculation of pension
benefits calculated, in part, under an accrual rule). See generally Sorock, supra note 51,
at 1212–13 (discussing, in detail, the various judicial responses to the Lilly Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act).
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decision” under the Act varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.60
E. Paycheck Fairness Act
Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY) and Representative Rosa DeLauro (D-CT)
introduced the Paycheck Fairness Act in January 2009 to remedy some of the
shortcomings of the Fair Pay Act.61 One aim of the bill was to strengthen the
amount of damages a prevailing plaintiff could recover; another goal was to
close a loophole in one of the four affirmative defenses available to employers
under the Equal Pay Act.62 Nevertheless, despite approval by the House of
Representatives, the Senate rejected the Paycheck Fairness Act on November
10, 2010.63
III. DISCUSSION
A. Congress Should Reintroduce the Paycheck Fairness Act or Otherwise
Remedy the Issues the PFA Sought to Address
While the Fair Pay Act restored the rights the Ledbetter decision removed,
there are still problems that persist with the enforcement of equal pay for equal
work.64 First, the Equal Pay Act provides an employer with an affirmative
defense when the employer can show that it based the allegedly discriminatory
pay differential on a factor other than sex.65 Many employers use this defense
to defeat plaintiffs’ Equal Pay Act claims by asserting the reason for differences
between two employees’ pay is not sex.66 The Paycheck Fairness Act would
have closed this loophole by requiring the employer to show the following:
that it used a “bona fide factor . . . not based upon or derived from a sex-based
60.
See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT OF 2009:
CURRENT STATUS AND EMERGING ISSUES 2–3 (2009) [hereinafter NWLC, EMERGING ISSUES],
available at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Ledbetter_Act_Current_Status_
and_Emerging_Issues.pdf (showing different types of claims that have been raised under
the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act and how different jurisdictions have ruled).
61.
Pay Equity Information, supra note 1.
62.
See NWLC, STRENGTHEN EQUAL PAY ACT, supra note 3, at 1–2 (stating that other
aims include: improving the remedies available; facilitating class action claims; prohibiting
employer retaliation, modifying the “establishment” requirement; improving the collection
of pay information by the EEOC; and reinstating pay equity programs and enforcement at
the Department of Labor).
63.
See Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 182, 111th Cong. (2009); see also Pay Equity
Information, supra note 1 (stating the vote was 58–41, mostly along party lines).
64.
See NWLC, EMERGING ISSUES, supra note 60, at 2–3 (discussing problems of
interpretation that have come before the courts, including problems with retroactivity and
problems with the actual reach of the Act).
65.
See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006) (providing four exemptions to the general
prohibition of pay disparity); see also NWLC, PAYCHECK FAIRNESS, supra note 24, at 2–3
(noting that a number of courts have allowed “factors other than sex” exemptions in their
decisions, resulting in employers’ being allowed to pay male employees more than female
employees).
66.
See NWLC, PAYCHECK FAIRNESS, supra note 29, at 2 (asserting that judicial
misinterpretation of the “factors other than sex” defense would be remedied with the
Paycheck Fairness Act).
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differential;” that the “factor other than sex” was “job-related to the position
in question;” and that use of a “factor other than sex” to distinguish pay was
“consistent with business necessity.”67 Under the Paycheck Fairness Act, if the
employee could show that “an alternative employment practice” could have
served “the same business purpose without producing a pay differential and
the employer refused to adopt” the practice, then the employer would not have
prevailed on the “factor other than sex” defense.68
A second aim of the PFA was to increase the amount of damages awarded to a
prevailing plaintiff.69 Unlike awards under Title VII or the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, awards under the Equal Pay Act do not include
compensatory or punitive damages.70 The prevailing plaintiff in an Equal Pay
Act claim is entitled to back pay during the relevant limitations period and an
additional, equal, amount as liquidated damages.71 Usually, the award of back
pay and liquidated damages is not very large.72 By not being allowed to receive
compensatory or punitive damages, victims of sex-based wage discrimination
receive different treatment than other workplace discrimination victims.73
B. Application: Dukes v. Wal-Mart
An example of how wage inequality has emerged in a non-white-collar
professional setting is Dukes v. Wal-Mart.74 Here, a female employee, Betty
Dukes, who initially had received an excellent ninety-day review and a
promotion, alleged that she later experienced discrimination and retaliation

67.
Id. at 4.
68.
Id.
69.
See Closing the Loophole, supra note 6 (detailing that the Paycheck Fairness Act
would allow for both compensatory and punitive damages and would eliminate the cap on
damages).
70.
See also NWLC, STRENGTHEN EQUAL PAY ACT, supra note 3, at 1 (explaining that
the Equal Pay Act does not permit the award of compensatory or punitive damages); cf.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2006) (providing for back pay and reinstatement but no other
damages).
71.
See NWLC, STRENGTHEN EQUAL PAY ACT, supra note 3, at 1 (comparing the
remedies of the Equal Pay Act with those of the Paycheck Fairness Act and finding the
Paycheck Fairness Act remedies of compensatory and punitive damages superior).
72.
See id. (noting that damage awards under the Equal Pay Act are insubstantial on
the whole).
73.
See Closing the Loophole, supra note 6 (observing that the Equal Pay Act
remedies are not as far-reaching as those in other anti-discrimination statutes).
74.
603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, No. 10-277 (U.S. argued Mar. 29, 2011).
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for complaining to her District Manager.75 Dukes claimed that her supervisors
never gave her the opportunity to train for higher-level and higher-paying
positions and reprimanded her more harshly for mistakes than her male
counterparts.76 Dukes, along with six other female employees, filed a class
action suit on June 8, 2001.77 The plaintiffs allege that Wal-Mart pays women
less than men in comparable positions, even when the lower-paid women have
higher performance ratings and greater seniority than their male counterparts,
and that women “receive fewer—and wait longer for—promotions to in-store
management positions.”78 In addition, they allege that Wal-Mart’s corporate
culture encourages “gender stereotyping and discrimination” and that this
treatment “is common to all women who work or have worked in Wal-Mart
stores.”79
One issue is whether it was appropriate for the district court to grant class
certification under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.80 On December 6,
2010, the Supreme Court granted Wal-Mart’s petition for certiorari and heard
oral argument on March 29, 2011.81
This case is important because of its potential social ramifications.82 WalMart, a large corporation, is one of the largest employers in the United States.83
A favorable outcome for Dukes and the other plaintiffs would send a strong
message not only to Wal-Mart, but to other employers as well; discriminatory
promotion and compensation policies toward female employees are

75.
See WAL-MART WATCH, BETTY V. GOLIATH: A HISTORY OF DUKES V. WAL-MART
5 (2006), available at http://walmartwatch.com/img/blog/dukes_backgrounder.pdf
(recounting allegations that Ms. Dukes experienced retaliation through “1) discipline
for procedures regularly used by male employees without being reprimanded; 2) not
allowing her to train for a department manager position; 3) demotion to cashier and being
falsely accused of violating company policy while performing a transaction that had been
performed many times by Ms. Dukes and other employees in the past without incident;
4) a reduction in hours and hourly wage; 5) not being informed of at least four un-posted
promotional opportunities (department and/or support manager positions) for which she
would have been eligible but were each filled by males; and, 6) being discouraged from
applying for future department manager positions”).
76.
Id. at 5.
77.
603 F.3d 571, 577–78 (noting plaintiffs’ class alleged rampant Title VII
violations).
78.
Id. at 577.
79.
Id. at 577–78.
80.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (requiring commonality of facts for all members of
the representative class in order to permit certification); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
131 S. Ct. 795 (2010) (mem.) (granting certiorari to the question of “[w]hether the class
certification ordered under Rule 23(b)(2) was consistent with Rule 23(a)”).
81.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010).
82.
See WAL-MART WATCH, supra note 75, at 4–5 (discussing the potential important
implications of Dukes for consumers, investors, and employees alike, such as, risk to the
“Wal-Mart ‘brand’ in the public eye”).
83.
See WALMART, CORPORATE FACT SHEET 1 (2010), available at http://www.
walmartstores.com/download/2230.pdf (stating that Wal-Mart is one of the largest

private employers in the United States).
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intolerable.84 As one attorney, who represents the Dukes class, explained the
crux of the issue, “People keep shopping at Wal-Mart because they don’t connect the fact that the low price they’re paying is effectively subsidized by the
woman at the checkout counter.”85
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the existing laws protecting wage equality, wage inequality
remains. Savvy employers are able to defeat many legitimate EPA claims
simply by asserting that a factor other than sex prompted a difference in pay.86
When employees do prevail, the damages they obtain are generally a drop in
the bucket for their employers.87 Given the tough financial times that most
Americans have been facing during this recession, women suffer harder hits to
their wallet than men do as a result of the pay disparity.88
However, the political makeup of the 112th Congress makes it unclear
whether any member of Congress will reintroduce the Paycheck Fairness Act
and put it up for another vote before 2013. Regardless, the fight for equal
pay for equal work must continue. Forty-eight years out from the passage
of the Equal Pay Act, significant wage gaps between men and women are
unacceptable.

84.
See WAL-MART WATCH, supra note 75, at 4, 9 (stating that this litigation is being
watched closely by competitors while law firms are releasing reports to their clients on how
to avoid similar class-action employment litigation).
85.
Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
86.
NWLC, PAYCHECK FAIRNESS, supra note 29, at 1.
87.
See Closing the Loophole, supra note 6 (“Employers would gamble that it costs
less to pay damages than to create workplaces free of discrimination.”).
88.
See NWLC, WOMEN’S LOWER WAGES, supra note 5, at 1–2. At least one reason
that wage gaps continue—and are exacerbated—in a bad economy are cultural perceptions
that women are only secondary contributors to household income. See e.g. Steger v. Gen.
Electric Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1079 (11th Cir. 2003) (detailing that one of the reasons that
management told Steger that she could not have a wage increase was because she did not
“need” one since she could rely on her husband’s salary).

